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Note
EXPERT TESTIMONY: SEEKING AN
APPROPRIATE ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD




“Mary,” a fourteen-year-old child of divorce, frantically phones
her mother one night to report that her father has “made a pass” at her.
Mary begs her mother to take her from her father’s house. Alarmed,
Mary’s mother drives to the house and takes Mary away. Later that
night, Mary discusses the incident with her mother and grandmother,
though now, she downplays the incident. Mary explains that she
merely got “spooked” by her father’s behavior and insists that he did
not assault her.
A few days later, Mary’s grandmother takes Mary to her father’s
house to retrieve her belongings. While at her father’s house, Mary
says to her grandmother: “By the way, Grandma, that mess the other
night, . . . I made a mountain out of a molehill. My dad didn’t do any-
thing to me.” During the next few months, Mary continues to see her
father occasionally, but she is never alone with him.
One year later, Mary’s English teacher assigns her students the
task of keeping a journal. One of Mary’s journal entries describes the
incident at her father’s house. The journal entry reveals much more
than just a “pass.” Mary writes in her journal that her father forced her
to have sexual intercourse with him. The journal entry also describes
other instances of molestation and rape. Before entering this account in
her journal, Mary told only her boyfriend that she had engaged in in-
tercourse with her father.
When confronted with Mary’s allegations, Mary’s father denies
her story completely. He admits to having kissed Mary and to having
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asked her to join him in bed, but he insists that these overtures were
merely “games” intended to reveal whether his daughter was sexually
active.
Thereafter, the local prosecutor charges Mary’s father with first
degree criminal sexual conduct. At the trial, the prosecution presents
Mary as the first witness. She again recounts the story of intercourse,
molestation, and rape that appeared in her journal. On cross examina-
tion, the defense attempts to discredit Mary’s allegations by suggesting
that her behavior has been inconsistent with that of a true child abuse
victim. The defense suggests that Mary’s behavioral patterns show that
she could not be a victim of sexual abuse by her father and concen-
trates its attack on four specific aspects of Mary’s behavior: (1) the de-
layed disclosure of the intercourse; (2) the way in which Mary revealed
the incident; (3) Mary’s initial tendency to deny the fact of intercourse;
and (4) Mary’s continued desire and willingness to see her father.
Furthermore, the defense seizes upon Mary’s inability to remember her
conversations with others about the incident. Finally, the defense at-
tempts to make Mary’s allegations appear retaliatory by recounting the
bitterness of the divorce between Mary’s parents and by noting that
earlier entries in Mary’s journal reveal that she was upset with her fa-
ther because of the divorce.
This tale about “Mary” essentially tells a very real story—a story
that led to the conviction of a father for the sexual abuse of his
daughter in People v. Beckley.1 In Beckley, the testimony of the vic-
timized daughter was necessary to obtain the conviction. But perhaps
even more crucial to the prosecution’s case was the “expert” testi-
mony of a certified social worker. To rebut the defense’s attack on
the veracity of the daughter’s story, the prosecutor in Beckley pre-
sented a social worker who testified that inconsistencies in allegations
of abuse, like the inconsistencies in the daughter’s story, do not nec-
essarily show that the allegations are lies.2 In Beckley, the social
worker testified that inconsistent stories may, in fact, be an attempt
by a victim to minimize the event.3 In the end, the social worker’s tes-
timony probably ensured that the jury did not misjudge the daugh-
ter’s post-incident behavior. Without the social worker’s testimony,
the story told by the victim in Beckley, like the stories of so many vic-
1. 456 N.W.2d 391, 393-94 (Mich. 1990).
2. See id. at 394.
3. See id.
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tims of child sexual abuse, would probably have appeared quite un-
reliable to the average lay juror or judge.
The Beckley prosecution highlights a serious problem in our na-
tion’s courts. Although the Michigan court permitted the social
worker’s expert opinion in the Beckley case,4 courts in several other
states would not have allowed such testimony into evidence. If the
crime had occurred just a few hundred miles away in Kentucky, the
social worker would not have been allowed to testify because the
courts of that state do not allow social scientists to offer expert scien-
tific testimony.5 Thus, in a Kentucky courtroom, the only support for
the accusation would have been the belated and inconsistent story of
the victim. Without the social worker’s testimony to help explain the
victim’s behavior, in all likelihood a Kentucky prosecutor would have
been unable to obtain a conviction.
What may be most curious about the drastically different ap-
proaches of Michigan and Kentucky courts to testimony like that of-
fered by the social worker in Beckley is that the different approaches
are not the result of facially different rules of evidence. In fact, the
states have substantially the same written rules of evidence, modeled
on the Federal Rules of Evidence, for relevancy and expert testi-
mony.6 The disparity in outcomes stems not from the rules them-
selves, but from the courts’ very different interpretations of those
rules. For example, Michigan’s supreme court has recognized a need
for expert explanation of the “seemingly inconsistent responses”
evoked in a child who has been the victim of sexual abuse,7 while
Kentucky’s highest court has remained steadfast in its assertion that
the jury is fully capable of understanding the reactions of the child
4. See id. at 409 (allowing expert testimony to rebut an inference that certain behavior of
complainants is not uncharacteristic of child sexual abuse victims).
5. See, e.g., Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1996) (holding that
social science expert testimony is only probative on the issue of the complainant’s credibility
and, therefore, is inadmissible because “there is no such thing as expertise in the credibility of
children”).
6. In fact, Kentucky’s and Michigan’s rules of evidence for relevancy and scientific evi-
dence are virtually identical. For the rules concerning relevancy, compare KY. R. EVID. 401-
403 with MICH. R. EVID. 401-403. For the rules for scientific evidence, compare KY. R. EVID.
702 with MICH. R. EVID. 702.
7. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 400-02 (holding that social science expert testimony is relevant
under MICH. R. EVID. 401-402 and that the evidence is therefore admissible because it “assists
the trier of fact” under MICH. R. EVID. 702).
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without explanatory testimony from an expert.8 Furthermore, the
court in Michigan has found that expert testimony is relevant and
admissible because of the “uniqueness of a child victim’s reaction,”9
while Kentucky’s court has insisted that such expert testimony is not
helpful and, therefore, not relevant.10 Though courts in both states are
skeptical of expert testimony from social scientists,11 Kentucky’s court
has taken the absolute position of excluding any expert testimony of
the sort offered in Beckley.
The divergent positions of these two jurisdictions provide but
one example of the difficulty state courts face when dealing with ex-
pert testimony from social scientists. This Note explores how courts
treat social science expert testimony in prosecutions of child sexual
abuse. Part I considers the special characteristics of child sexual
abuse prosecutions that create a need for social science testimony.12
Part II explains the different types of testimony which might be of-
fered in response to that need. Next, Part III examines the various
rules of evidence and how some state courts apply these rules to the
testimony of social scientists. Part IV uses an analysis of a few par-
ticular jurisdictions, including Michigan and Kentucky, to illustrate
how varying approaches often determine the success or failure of
child sexual abuse prosecutions. Finally, the Conclusion asserts that
the most appropriate treatment of this expert testimony is found in
jurisdictions that differentiate between social science expertise and
8. See Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 695-96 (citing KY. R. EVID. 403 as support for the proposi-
tion that social science expert testimony “lack[s] relevancy and invade[s] the province of the
jury by expressing an opinion on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence”).
9. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 404.
10. See Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 695.
11. See, e.g., Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 690-91 (“[T]his Court has repeatedly expressed its
distrust of expert testimony which purport[s] to determine criminal conduct based on a per-
ceived psychological syndrome.” (footnote omitted)); Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 404 n.47
(recognizing that expert testimony based on syndromes is “still in its embryonic stage” and that
as more information about victim behavior comes to light “there is the possibility that syn-
drome testimony will become a more reliable source of evidence”).
12. This Note will not discuss the issue of prosecuting child sexual abuse cases where the
prosecution has been delayed because of suppressed memories that surface during adulthood.
Allegations of abuse based on repressed memories create an entirely new and distinct set of
problems for prosecutors. For a discussion of the issues surrounding repressed memories of
child sexual abuse, see generally MARK PENDERGRAST, VICTIMS OF MEMORY: SEX ABUSE
ACCUSATIONS AND SHATTERED LIVES (2d ed. 1996); Lynn Holdsworth, Is It Repressed Mem-
ory with Delayed Recall or Is It False Memory Syndrome? The Controversy and Its Potential
Legal Implications, 22 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 103 (1998); Richard A. Leo, The Social and Legal
Construction of Repressed Memory, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 653 (1997).
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other forms of scientific expertise and that treat social science exper-
tise according to an appropriately tailored standard.
I. THE DIFFICULTY WITH CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS
The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect defines child
sexual abuse as “contacts or interactions between a child and an adult
when the child is being used as an object of gratification for adult
sexual needs or desires.”13 The spectrum of such abusive conduct
ranges from indecent exposure and sexually explicit verbal abuse to
forcible rape.14 Though it is possible to catalog the types of abuse
young victims may endure, it is impossible to know precisely how
many victims there are in the United States. According to some
studies, the reported incidence of child sexual abuse ranges from 3%
to 15% for boys and from 12% to 38% for girls.15
The sexual abuse of children is not merely a social problem in
this country; it is criminal behavior. Because of the varying ways to
define child sexual abuse, it is rare for a state to maintain separate
provisions which criminalize these acts.16 Rather, most states address
the problem of child sexual abuse under the traditional framework of
rape and sexual assault laws.17 The officials prosecuting child sexual
13. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILD: SELECTED
READINGS 1 (1980). There are many ways to define child sexual abuse. For additional defini-
tions, see Donald C. Bross, Terminating the Parent-Child Legal Relationship as a Response to
Child Sexual Abuse, 26 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 287, 287 (1995) (defining child sexual abuse as in-
volving “sexual contact with children whose consent is inadequate or impossible, who lack
equality, who are coerced, or who are not protected from inappropriate sexual contact”); James
O. Hacking, III, Comment, Won’t You Be My Neighbor?: Do Community Notification Statutes
Violate Sexual Offenders’ Rights Under the Constitution’s Ban on the Passage of Ex Post Facto
Laws?, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761, 800 & n.313 (1997) (noting a lack of consensus on a precise
definition of child sexual abuse and offering several different definitions).
14. See Andrew Cohen, Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical Char-
acteristics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEO. L.J. 429, 429 n.1 (1985).
15. See Sanford N. Katz, Foreword to INTERVENING IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 1, 4
(Kathleen Murray & David A. Gough eds., 1991) (“Since people may be reluctant to admit to
having been victims of [sexual] abuse, the actual percentages may be much higher.”).
16. Michigan comes close to having such a provision. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b-c
(1991) (combining into a single statute the criminalization of varying degrees of sexual conduct
depending upon the age and mental capacity of the victim, the familial and authoritative rela-
tionship between the perpetrator and the victim, and the nature of the sexual conduct).
17. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(b) (West Supp. 1999) (defining sexual intercourse
with a person under 18 as a form of statutory rape); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.110 (Banks-
Baldwin 1997) (treating child sexual abuse as a category of general abuse and assault); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122.1 (West Rev. Supp. 1998) (defining sexual intercourse with another
person who is less than 16 years of age as statutory sexual assault).
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abuse, however, face almost insurmountable hurdles because of the
very nature of this crime.
Child sexual abuse cases are not easy to prosecute.18 For one
thing, it is often difficult for outsiders even to determine whether this
form of abuse has occurred. Like other types of child abuse, this type
most often occurs in private, away from potential eyewitnesses,19 and
more often than not, the perpetrator of child sexual abuse is a mem-
ber of the victim’s family.20 Child sexual abuse is also difficult to
prove because sexual abusers of children rarely leave physical evi-
dence of their crime.21 Instead of bruises or physical scars, child sex-
ual abusers usually leave their victims wracked with varying degrees
of psychological and emotional trauma.22
A child-victim of sexual abuse, like “Mary,” who has no other
eyewitnesses or physical evidence to corroborate her allegations,
must rely on her own story to prove the abuse. Child sexual abuse
cases often boil down to a high stakes game of “he said, she said.” In
such cases, a defendant’s primary defense might be to attack the
credibility of the victim’s story.23 When combined with the “beyond a
reasonable doubt” standard, the child-victim and her story are likely
to lose this contest.
The problems with prosecuting child sexual abuse cases are in-
creased by the fact that most children fail to report sexual abuse.24
18. The story of “Mary” illustrates just some of the problematic characteristics of child
sexual abuse. In this case, the alleged abuser was a family member—her father. Also, the abuse
left no physical evidence and occurred in private. And finally, Mary only reluctantly (and in-
consistently) recounted the abuse months later.
Although rape and sexual assault cases present similar issues, like those relating to
physical evidence, memory and recantation, the discussion here is limited to child sexual abuse.
This limitation in topic is helpful because a discussion of rape and sexual assault in general ne-
cessitates a discussion of consent and evidence related to that issue; the minority of the child
necessarily removes the possibility of consent to the behavior.
19. See Lisa R. Askowitz & Michael H. Graham, The Reliability of Expert Psychological
Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2027, 2033 (1994); John
E.B. Myers et al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1989); Veronica Serrato, Note, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Spec-
trum of Uses, 68 B.U. L. REV. 155, 158 (1988).
20. See Dwight M. Wells, Expert Testimony: To Admit or Not to Admit, 57 FLA. B.J. 673,
673 (1983).
21. See Myers et al., supra note 19, at 34-36. Where the sexual abuse results in physical
trauma, the symptoms are clear, and a medical diagnosis is regularly obtained. See id. at 38-51.
22. See id. at 52-54.
23. See id. at 89.
24. See David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About Child Complainants in
Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of Novel Psychological Evidence, 77
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More importantly, if they do, it is common to have a significant lapse
in time between the actual occurrence and the ultimate reporting of
the abusive incident by the child.25 Even then, the child may not in-
clude details of all of the abusive conduct in her initial revelation.26
Furthermore, children often recant or alter their allegations of
abuse.27
Delay and recantation are particularly common in cases of intra-
family abuse.28 In these situations, the delay may be encouraged by
“long-standing active or passive family collusion and support”29
aimed at avoiding disclosure for fear that public revelation of the
abuse will result in social rejection, economic disaster, a general
breakdown of the family unit, or the incarceration of the accused.30
Similarly, recantation may follow an allegation of intrafamily abuse if
the child witnesses extensive damage wreaked upon her family as a
result of her revelation.31
The delays, half-truths, and recantations that often characterize
a child’s allegation of abuse are open to attack by a defendant.32 The
defendant may attempt to demonstrate that a child’s delay or incom-
plete disclosure is evidence of untruth or that a recantation after the
initial allegation demonstrates the untrustworthiness of the child.33
The conflict between the adult’s version and the child-victim’s ver-
sion of an event may suggest to jurors a misrecollection or fabrication
                                                                                                                                     
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 60-61 (1986); Diane E.H. Russell, The Incidence and Preva-
lence of Intrafamilial and Extrafamilial Sexual Abuse of Female Children, 7 CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT 133, 142 (1983); Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syn-
drome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177, 186 (1983).
25. See Myers et al., supra note 19, at 86-87; Summit, supra note 24, at 186.
26. See Myers et al., supra note 19, at 87 (“When disclosure occurs, the child may refrain
from telling the entire story, and may reveal a little at a time to ‘test the waters’ and see how
adults react.”).
27. See Summit, supra note 24, at 188.
28. See Wells, supra note 20, at 673.
29. C. Henry Kempe, Sexual Abuse, Another Hidden Problem: The 1977 C. Anderson Ald-
rich Lecture, 62 PEDIATRICS 382 (1978), reprinted in CHILD ABUSE: COMMISSION AND
OMISSION 97, 99 (Joanne V. Cook & Roy T. Bowles eds., 1980).
30. See DAVID P. H. JONES, INTERVIEWING THE SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILD 9 (1992);
Kempe, supra note 29, at 99.
31. See Summit, supra note 24, at 188.
32. See, e.g., Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind. 1995) (taking judicial notice of the
weakness of victim testimony).
33. See, e.g., People v. Matlock, 395 N.W.2d 274, 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing
that the complainant’s delay in disclosing the abuse be attacked by the defendant and, there-
fore, holding that expert testimony may be used to explain such delays).
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of the story on the part of the child.34 All of these commonly held no-
tions and misperceptions help defendants win the battle of “he said,
she said.”
The difficulty, however, in prosecuting cases of child sexual
abuse goes beyond problems of delayed reporting, inconsistent rec-
ollection, or recantation. Even in the absence of these issues, the de-
fense may use the mere fact of the child’s age or immaturity to por-
tray the child as intrinsically less trustworthy than the adult
defendant.35 Even when a child is capable of testifying in court,36 she
will rarely be a good witness by traditional standards.37 Both
“developmentally and psychologically,” a child is, at best, a less than
ideal witness: she is frequently “unable to give consistent, spontane-
ous, and detailed reports of her sexual abuse.”38 In addition, the vic-
tim is likely to develop a “fear [for her] safety, fear of future sexual
abuse, feelings of depression or anxiety, embarrassment at peers’
knowledge of happenings, and a negative view of sex,” all of which
can handicap her “ability to give clear and consistent testimony.”39
The combination of these factors can result in a witness who appears
frightened, anxious, and unwilling to testify.40 The jury, in turn, may
be less likely to find such a child credible.
Aside from the potential weakness of accusatory testimony and
the absence of corroborative evidence, prosecutors of child sexual
abuse cases also face the judicial system’s longstanding mistrust of
sexual abuse allegations.41 For example, the 1970 edition of Professor
Wigmore’s treatise on evidence cautioned that “[n]o judge should
ever let a sex-offence charge go to the jury unless the female com-
plainant’s social history and mental makeup have been examined and
34. See, e.g., People v. Roscoe, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45, 49 (Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing a need
for expert testimony regarding the credibility of victims as a class, but limiting that testimony to
situations where a credibility gap exists between the defendant and the child-victim).
35. See Myers et al., supra note 19, at 92.
36. There are many reasons why children may be incapable of giving testimony. See gen-
erally John E.B. Myers et al., Psychological Research on Children as Witnesses: Practical Impli-
cations for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3, 59-77 (1996)
(discussing issues related to a child’s memory, suggestibility, emotional capacity, and under-
standing of the legal system in the context of the child testifying at trial).
37. See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 19, at 2033.
38. Serrato, supra note 19, at 159.
39. State v. Snapp, 715 P.2d 939, 942 (Idaho 1986) (summarizing expert testimony about
common emotional reactions).
40. See Serrato, supra note 19, at 159.
41. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 431.
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testified to by a qualified physician.”42 This comment reflects the ju-
dicial attitude toward female sex abuse victims generally:43 where the
allegation is one of sexual abuse, there is an increased likelihood that
the story was fabricated.44 In light of this history of mistrust of female
sex crime victims,45 it is questionable whether the “playing field” for
the prosecution of sex offenses committed against children is a level
one at all.
II. THE USE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE TESTIMONY IN CHILD SEXUAL
ABUSE CASES
The combination of the often confusing behavior exhibited by
victims and the prejudices held by the general public can lead juries
in child sexual abuse cases to doubt that the child has been truthful.46
To prevent this occurrence, prosecutors frequently attempt to pro-
vide alternate explanations for the unusual behavior exhibited by al-
leged victims of child sexual abuse.47 Prosecutors might offer expert
42. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 924a, at 460 (James H.
Chadbourne ed., rev. ed. 1970).
43. See JOHN E.B. MYERS, CHILD WITNESS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.21, at 173-74 (1987);
Myers et al., supra note 19, at 109; Serrato, supra note 19, at 174-75.
44. See, e.g., People v. Russell, 443 P.2d 794, 802 (Cal. 1968) (approving the use of expert
testimony that questions the credibility of the child-victim despite probable flaws in the expert’s
analysis).
45. See Janine Benedet, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims and the Unwel-
come Influence of Rape Law, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 125, 173 (1995) (discussing how Title
VII’s proscription of sex discrimination in employment includes a presumption that the plaintiff
welcomed sexual harassment); David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Criminal Law: Rape in the
Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1207 n.81 (1997) (explaining
how distrust of women claiming to have been raped has been incorporated into certain eviden-
tiary rules); Kathleen F. Ciarney, Note, Addressing Acquaintance Rape: The New Direction of
the Rape Reform Movement, 69 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 291, 291-93 (1995) (noting the common
assumption that women make false accusations of rape and have duties to prevent rapes from
occurring). See generally SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 42-56 (1987) (describing the history of
corroboration requirements and the relevancy of women’s sexual history for rape charges).
46. See, e.g., People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 870 (Mich. 1995) (taking judicial notice
of the fact that there are “common misperceptions regarding the behavior of the victim on
which a jury may draw an incorrect inference”); Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind.
1995) (noting the weaknesses commonly found in victim testimony and the likely interpretation
by the jury). But see Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 838 (Pa. 1992) (finding no need
for an expert explanation of the victim’s behavior).
47. See Steward, 652 N.E.2d at 496-99 (citing cases from 13 jurisdictions considering the
admission of expert testimony offered to explain inconsistencies and recantations in child sex-
ual abuse claims); Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1296 (Md. 1995) (citing cases from 14 juris-
dictions which permit the admission of post-traumatic stress disorder evidence “as rebuttal evi-
dence to refute defense contentions that the victim’s behavior is inconsistent with that of a
person who has been sexually abused or raped”).
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testimony from psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers who
have experience dealing with sexually abused children.48 These ex-
perts can be useful to the prosecution because they can explain the
possible reasons for the behavior of the alleged victim, thereby sug-
gesting to the jury that the child’s seemingly incongruous behavior
may not, in fact, show that she is not telling the truth.49 Ultimately,
the testimony of a psychiatrist, psychologist, or social worker may be
crucial in a prosecution because, regardless of the legitimacy of her
story, the victim might never be believed by a jury without explana-
tory testimony from a social science expert.50
A. The Type of Social Science Testimony Offered
Prosecutors often rely upon child sexual abuse experts who have
derived their expertise from a combination of scholarly training, per-
sonal interaction with abused and non-abused children, and a famili-
arity with the research and conclusions of similarly trained peers.51 In
general, these experts are likely to offer their testimony in order to
provide a context in which a child’s behavior may be rationally at-
tributed to factors other than dishonesty.52 To that end, experts often
rely upon a “syndrome” framework to help explain a victim’s behav-
ior.53
In child sexual abuse prosecutions, social scientists frequently
testify about the typical responses to sexual abuse.54 This type of evi-
48. See, e.g., Hutton, 663 A.2d at 1291 (noting that the prosecution called a clinical social
worker and a psychologist during its case in chief).
49. See Steward, 652 N.E.2d at 496 (“The reliability of syndrome evidence . . . is generally
accepted for purposes of helping the jury to understand that a complainant’s reactions are not
atypical of a young sexual assault victim.”).
50. See infra Part II.B (discussing the reasons which underlie the introduction of expert
testimony in child sexual abuse prosecutions).
51. See Myers et al., supra note 19, at 11-12.
52. See Cohen, supra note 14, at 441.
53. Syndrome has been defined generally as “a group of signs and symptoms, that collec-
tively indicate or characterize a disease, psychological disorder, or another abnormal condi-
tion.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1821 (3d ed.
1992). The seemingly insignificant disjunctive “indicate or characterize” is actually quite sig-
nificant in the evidentiary context because, most frequently, in the field of child sexual abuse,
the syndrome is used as a therapeutic tool, meaning it describes rather than indicates. See Myers
et al., supra note 19, at 67. In this context, mental health professionals employ a syndrome to
explain and understand a child’s unusual behavior rather than to establish the fact of abuse. See
id.
54. See Steward, 652 N.E.2d at 492-98 (summarizing the state-by-state treatment of expert
testimony given in child sexual abuse prosecutions).
STEELE TO PRINTER.DOC 04/29/99  4:24 PM
1999] CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS 943
dence is commonly introduced by a social worker or psychologist
who, certified as an expert, offers a “profile” of behavior that is fre-
quently observed in sexually abused children.55 This “profile” typi-
cally consists of a list of emotions, thoughts, and behaviors that in-
clude “‘a sense of danger,’ sleep disturbance, [a] decrease in
occupational function (i.e. going to school), . . . decreased interest in
events or activities in general, irritability, anger, poor concentration,
hypervigilance and exaggerated startle response (i.e. jumping when
someone walk[s] up behind her and touche[s] her),” as well as eating
disorders, regression (such as bed wetting), and sexual behavior (such
as excessive masturbation).56 The list of reactions used in profile tes-
timony is frequently accumulated as a result of the expert’s own re-
peated interaction with abused children,57 or borrowed from the
scholarship of social scientists who have organized the symptoms into
a “syndrome.”58
Syndrome evidence in child sexual abuse cases often reflects the
work of Dr. Roland J. Summit, who identified and defined Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS).59 In 1983, Dr.
Summit formulated CSAAS as a tool to assist mental health profes-
sionals in dealing with abused children.60 He offered the syndrome as
a “‘common language’ for the professionals working to protect sexu-
ally abused children.”61 Dr. Summit’s theory identifies five character-
istics commonly observed in sexually abused children: (1) secrecy; (2)
helplessness; (3) entrapment and accommodation; (4) delayed, con-
55. See, e.g., id. at 495 (listing a number of cases from other jurisdictions where such an
introduction occurred); People v. Peterson, 537 N.W.2d 857, 860 (Mich. 1995) (describing the
testimony of an expert who offered “the profile of a sexual abuse victim”).
56. Toro v. State, 642 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
57. See, e.g., Peterson, 537 N.W.2d at 860 (describing an expert’s testimony that her expe-
rience in treating about 100 children enabled her to verify the claims of an alleged victim).
58. See, e.g., People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Mich. 1990) (permitting expert tes-
timony that “the bulk of psychiatric literature suggests that victims of sexual abuse exhibit cer-
tain patterns of behavior”). Several studies discuss the symptoms of child sexual abuse. See
Christine Adams-Tucker, Proximate Effects of Child Sexual Abuse in Childhood: A Report on
28 Children, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1252, 1254 (1982); Marcellina Mian et al., Review of 125
Children 6 Years of Age and Under Who Were Sexually Abused, 10 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT
223, 226 (1986); Carl M. Rogers & Tremaine Terry, Clinical Intervention with Boy Victims of
Sexual Abuse, in VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE AND AGGRESSION 91, 93-97 (Irving Stuart & Jo-
anne G. Greer eds., 1984); Summit, supra note 24, at 181-88.
59. See Summit, supra note 24, at 181.
60. See id. at 191.
61. Myers et al., supra note 19, at 67 (describing Summit’s accommodation syndrome).
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flicted, and unconvincing disclosure; and (5) retraction.62 These char-
acteristics are behavioral coping mechanisms that emerge because
the child is “fearful, tentative and confused about the nature of the
continuing sexual experience and the outcome of disclosure.”63
CSAAS does not prove abuse because it assumes that the abuse oc-
curred.64 Nonetheless, CSAAS is helpful in identifying common re-
sponses to child sexual abuse and in establishing reasons for the be-
havior of child sexual abuse victims.65
Social scientists and courts also rely upon another syndrome la-
bel, Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome (CSAS). Unlike CSAAS, CSAS is
not a theory attributable to a particular psychologist or psychological
study. Rather, it is an amalgam of the personal experience of a given
expert combined with what the expert knows of empirical studies and
explanatory theories (such as Dr. Summit’s CSAAS).66 CSAS is
merely the label some courts and experts apply to the generalized
laundry list of behaviors which are commonly observed in abuse vic-
tims.67 For example, in Steward v. State,68 the Indiana Supreme Court
explained, “[o]ur discussion today encompasses not only CSAAS but
also similar descriptions of ‘typical’ behavior profiles or patterns,
whether or not termed ‘syndromes,’ all of which we shall refer to
62. See Summit, supra note 24, at 181. The first two stages establish a child’s potential to
become a victim of sexual abuse. See id. Stage 1 is secrecy, an element inherent in the abusive
adult-child relationship. See id. The offender makes it clear to the child that it would be bad
and dangerous for the child to tell anyone about the sexual abuse. See id. Stage 2 is helpless-
ness, the absence of power a child has in a relationship with a parent or trusted adult. See id. at
182-83.
Stages 3 through 5 occur as a result of abuse. See id. at 184-88. In Stage 3, the child, faced
with continuing helpless victimization, learns that she must accept her situation if she is to sur-
vive it. See id. at 184. To facilitate this acceptance, the child may develop accommodation
mechanisms including self-hate, multiple personalities, alternate states of consciousness, self-
mutilation, promiscuous sexual activity, projection of rage, and substance abuse. See id. at 185.
Stage 4 is “delayed, confused and unconvincing disclosure” of the abuse. Id. at 186. Stage
5 is retraction of the accusation. See id. at 188. The child may reverse her accusation because
the offender and other family members influence her to make family life return to normal. See
id. “[T]his simple lie carries more credibility than the most explicit claims of incestuous en-
trapment . . . [and] confirms adult expectations that children cannot be trusted.” Id.
63. Id. at 178.
64. See Myers et al., supra note 19, at 66-67.
65. See id.
66. See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing CSAAS).
67. See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 19, at 2036 (“Under the guise of the child sexual
abuse syndrome, courts often admit all expert testimony that is even minimally relevant to
whether the child has been abused.”); id. at 2068-69.
68. 652 N.E.2d 490 (Ind. 1995).
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generally as ‘child sexual abuse syndrome.’”69 Pennsylvania’s supreme
court did the same when it lumped all testimony concerning the be-
havioral patterns of sexually abused children under the label CSAS.70
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)71 is a syndrome that might
be included in the profile offered by an expert in a child sexual abuse
69. Id. at 493.
70. See Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 832 (Pa. 1992) (noting that Child Sexual
Abuse Syndrome is also referred to as Sexually Abused Child Syndrome, Child Abuse Syn-
drome, and Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome).
71. The American Psychiatric Association characterizes post-traumatic stress disorder as
having the following diagnostic criteria:
A. The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both the following
were present:
(1) the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or
events that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to
the physical integrity of self or others
(2) the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. . . .
B. The traumatic event is persistently reexperienced in one (or more) of the follow-
ing ways:
(1) recurrent and intrusive distressing recollections of the event . . . .
(2) recurrent distressing dreams of the event. . . .
(3) acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring . . . .
(4) intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that
symbolize or resemble an aspect of the traumatic event
(5) physiological reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues . . .
C. Persistent avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma and numbing of general
responsiveness (not present before the trauma), as indicated by three (or more) of
the following:
(1) efforts to avoid thoughts, feelings, or conversations associated with the
trauma
(2) efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the
trauma
(3) inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma
(4) markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities
(5) feeling of detachment or estrangement from others
(6) restricted range of affect . . .
(7) sense of foreshortened future . . .
D. Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before the trauma), as indi-
cated by two (or more) of the following:
(1) difficulty falling or staying asleep
(2) irritability or outbursts of anger
(3) difficulty concentrating
(4) hypervigilance
(5) exaggerated startle response
E. Duration of disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C, and D) is more than 1 month.
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prosecution.72 Because evidence of PTSD is admissible in other con-
texts,73 prosecutors of child sexual abuse cases might attempt to capi-
talize on PTSD’s legacy of admissibility by offering testimony which
refers explicitly to PTSD.74 In such a case, the expert would explain
the elements of the disorder and then match those elements to a
child’s behavior.75
Alternatively, the expert can implicitly incorporate PTSD into
the profile—without attaching the specific label of PTSD—by com-
paring the complaining child’s behavior with that of known child
abuse victims.76 PTSD, unlike CSAAS, neither presumes nor con-
cludes that the source of any child’s behavior is sexual abuse.77
Rather, the syndrome is “merely a therapeutic tool” that “assumes
the presence of a stressor and then attaches a diagnosis to the child’s
reactions to it.”78 Furthermore, because PTSD may appear as a result
of virtually any traumatic event, the syndrome does not give any em-
phasis to particularly sexual forms of acting out, which makes the
symptomatic behavior more easily attributable to alternative stres-
sors.79
                                                                                                                                     
F. The disturbance causes clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occu-
pational, or other important areas of functioning.
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS IV 427-29 (4th ed. 1994).
72. See, e.g., Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1301 (Md. 1995) (admitting PTSD for context
only); State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 213 (N.M. 1993) (admitting PTSD evidence); State v.
Henry, 495 S.E.2d 463, 469 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (admitting PTSD diagnosis); see also Askowitz
& Graham, supra note 19, at 2046 (“In many child sexual abuse prosecutions, prosecutors offer
expert PTSD-based testimony that the child complainant’s behavior is consistent with being
sexually abused.”).
73. For example, PTSD is often admitted in rape prosecutions to rebut a defense conten-
tion of consent. See, e.g., State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (Kan. 1992) (“An examination of
the [scientific] literature clearly demonstrates that the so-called ‘rape trauma syndrome’ [a sub-
set of PTSD] is generally accepted to be a common reaction to sexual assault.”).
74. See, e.g., Hutton, 663 A.2d at 1294-95 (noting the prosecution’s contention that the
PTSD evidence should be admissible because “some courts have found the evidence scientifi-
cally reliable”).
75. See, e.g., id. at 1292.
76. See Askowitz & Graham, supra note 19, at 2046.
77. See Hutton, 663 A.2d at 1295 (noting that “causes other than sexual abuse may trigger
PTSD”).
78. Askowitz & Graham, supra note 19, at 2046 (footnote omitted).
79. See id. at 2046.
STEELE TO PRINTER.DOC 04/29/99  4:24 PM
1999] CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS 947
B. The Underlying Purpose of Expert Testimony
Behavioral science testimony, like that described in Section II.A,
provides a prosecutor with an invaluable opportunity to fortify the
typically weak testimony of the victim. Indeed, much of what has
been learned about children’s reactions to abuse by behavioral scien-
tists who work with abuse victims may run counter to the intuition of
the average juror.80 The introduction of the expertise of psychiatrists,
psychologists, and social workers, therefore, provides a means of cor-
recting the unfounded prejudices that may exist in the minds of some
jurors. But behavioral science evidence can go further than merely
correcting erroneous beliefs; it may provide a context in which a vic-
tim’s behavior can be rationalized and understood. Perhaps most im-
portantly, the knowledge of a behavioral scientist can be used to re-
but defense assertions that delay or inconsistencies in a victim’s story
are indicia of fabrication.81
Because the defense may try to capitalize on juror mispercep-
tions, a direct attack on the credibility of the accusing child creates a
ripe environment for a prosecutor to introduce rebuttal testimony
from a behavioral scientist. Most jurisdictions permit at least some
form of rebuttal testimony.82 However, a prosecutor may not want to
wait for an attack on the victim’s credibility before introducing be-
havioral science testimony. The prosecutor may attempt to present
behavioral science evidence as “anticipatory rebuttal” to the ex-
pected attack.83 Anticipatory rebuttal evidence, like rebuttal evi-
80. See Myers et al., supra note 19, at 89.
81. See id.
82. See Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 496 (Ind. 1995) (listing cases in numerous juris-
dictions which have allowed expert testimony to rebut claims by the defense that the child’s
behavior is inconsistent with the claim of abuse).
83. For example, Michigan’s courts have adopted a complex and tenuous rule which draws
a fine line between evidence which may be offered as part of the prosecution’s case in chief
(anticipatory rebuttal) and evidence which is limited to rebuttal. In People v. Peterson, 537
N.W. 2d 857 (Mich. 1995), the Michigan Supreme Court stated that the prosecution may pres-
ent expert testimony in its case in chief “to describe certain behavioral characteristics recogniz-
able in victims of child sexual abuse . . . to generally explain the common postincident behavior
of children who are victims of sexual abuse.” Id. at 868. Furthermore, the prosecutor may
comment on the evidence presented so as to “argue the reasonable inferences drawn from the
expert’s testimony and compare the expert testimony to the facts of the case.” Id. However, the
expert may not “testify that the particular child-victim’s behavior is consistent with that of a
sexually abused child” unless the defendant “raises the issue of the particular child-victim’s
postincident behavior or attacks the child’s credibility.” Id.
California has adopted a rule which permits all admissible expert testimony to be pre-
sented as anticipatory rebuttal:
STEELE TO PRINTER.DOC 04/29/99  4:24 PM
948 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol 48:933
dence, may correct a jury’s potential misconceptions as to the ex-
pected behavior of an abuse victim or the ability of a child to testify.84
Even absent any attack on credibility, a behavioral science expert
might rely upon a “profile” or “syndrome” allowing a jury to com-
pare the behavior exhibited by the victim with the behavior of other
victims of child sexual abuse.85
The introduction of social science expert testimony can present a
few problems, though. While expert testimony that is offered either
to provide a context for the complainant’s behavior or to rebut at-
tacks on her credibility can be appropriate, there is a danger that this
type of testimony will be inappropriately offered as substantive proof
that the alleged abuse occurred. When an expert purports to know
whether abuse has or has not occurred, the expert is offering substan-
tive evidence of abuse. Because “it is not possible [for an expert] to
‘know’ whether a child was abused,”86 many states have properly re-
fused to admit behavioral science evidence as substantive proof of
abuse.87 This exclusion is proper because “sexual abuse is an event,
not a diagnosable disorder.”88
Because “no symptom or set of symptoms is conclusive proof of
sexual abuse,” no social science expert can certify that a child’s accu-
sations of sexual abuse are true.89 Thus, testimony relating to the
“truth” of the complainant’s allegations may also be objectionable
because this type of testimony comes too close to predicting or
                                                                                                                                     
Denying the prosecution the opportunity to introduce [syndrome] testimony as part
of its case-in-chief rather than in rebuttal could lead to absurd results . . . . It would
be natural for a jury to wonder why the molestation was not immediately reported if
it had really occurred. In this case, the jury could further ask why [the complainant]
went back to appellant’s home a second time after the first molestation. If it were a
requirement of admissibility for the defense to identify and focus on the paradoxical
behavior, the defense would simply wait until closing argument before accentuating
the jurors’ misconceptions regarding the behavior. To eliminate the potential for
such results, the prosecution should be permitted to introduce properly limited
credibility evidence if the issue of a specific misconception is suggested by the evi-
dence.
People v. Patino, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 345, 349 (Ct. App. 1994).
84. See Myers et al., supra note 19, at 89.
85. See supra Part II.A (describing possible “profiles” or “syndromes”).
86. Myers et al., supra note 19, at 70. There is no certain means by which one may make a
determination of abuse. Rather “expert testimony on whether abuse occurred rests on assess-
ment of a wide range of information leading to a clinical judgment that sexual abuse is the most
likely explanation in particular cases.” Id. (emphasis added).
87. See Steward, 652 N.E.2d at 495 (“A significant number of state courts have recognized
as a misuse of the syndrome the admission of child sexual abuse syndrome testimony as sub-
stantive proof that abuse has been detected in a particular case.”).
88. Myers et al., supra note 19, at 72.
89. Id. at 61.
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evaluating the likelihood that the child is telling the truth.90 Because
there are no recognized experts in veracity,91 any attempt by an ex-
pert to quantify the likelihood that a witness is telling the truth would
infringe upon the jury’s autonomy in evaluating witness honesty.92
There is also a danger that a jury may over-value the testimony
of the expert and thereby convict the defendant largely because of
the expert’s generalized testimony about common reactions to abuse.
The danger here is that the jury may be improperly influenced by an
expert’s testimony about common reactions of victimized children
and that, in the absence of sufficient testimonial or physical evidence
of abuse, the jury may nevertheless conclude that the abuse occurred.
The problem of over-reliance can be overcome by “sterilizing” the
testimony by limiting the expert’s testimony to an objective, rather
than subjective, discussion that gives context to the complainant’s tes-
timony and to the behavior of abused children as a class.93
At its core, the determination that a given use of behavioral sci-
ence expert testimony is permissible or impermissible can be reduced
to the propriety of the use for which the testimony is offered. But
even more, the question of whether behavioral science expert testi-
mony is appropriate depends upon the court’s application of the rules
of evidence which govern that particular jurisdiction.
90. See id. at 121 (noting that a “majority of courts reject expert testimony which com-
ments directly on the credibility of individual children”).
91. See State v. Moran, 728 P.2d 248, 252 (Ariz. 1986) (“An expert’s belief in a witness’s
credibility ‘has never been a permissible subject of expert opinion . . . .’” (quoting MORRIS K.
UDALL & JOSEPH M. LIVERMORE, 1 LAW OF EVIDENCE § 22, at 30-31 (2d ed. 1982)); Robert
P. Mosteller, Syndromes and Politics in Criminal Trials and Evidence Law, 46 DUKE L.J. 461,
506 (1996) (“[E]xperts cannot yet determine with any certainty who is telling the truth based on
demeanor . . . .”).
92. Despite the prohibition on expert testimony relating to veracity, prosecutors may still
attempt to encroach on the jury’s role by introducing statistical evidence which effectively
quantifies the likelihood that a child is lying or telling the truth. See, e.g., Wheat v. State, 527
A.2d 269, 271 (Del. 1987). In Wheat, the trial court admitted expert testimony that “between
thirty percent and forty percent of children recant, alter, or otherwise minimize their original
allegations of sexual abuse, but that fewer than five percent recant and maintain the altered
statement,” and that it is “very uncommon” for a victim’s initial account to include all instances
and details of abuse. Id. at 271. While confirming the validity of the expertise, and recognizing
that there is a need to admit expert testimony to explain delays and recantation, the Delaware
Supreme Court reversed, refusing to admit the statistical evidence because “the expert was
permitted to establish a mathematical standard by which the trier of fact could evaluate the
complainant’s trial testimony.” Id. at 274.
93. See Myers et al., supra note 19, at 91.
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III. EXPERT TESTIMONY AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
Courts have struggled with the admissibility of expert testimony
for many years.94 The problem stems from a longstanding skepticism
and mistrust of expert testimony.95 In addition, the fact that many
types of expert testimony may be offered makes it difficult to estab-
lish a single standard of admissibility which treats all forms of exper-
tise fairly.96 The admissibility of such testimony is therefore governed
not only by the general rules of evidence regarding relevancy, proba-
tivity, and prejudice, but also by specific rules addressing special is-
sues related to the use of expert testimony.97 Because of our federal
system, the actual rules of evidence vary between federal courts and
state courts, and even among the states. Nevertheless, nearly every
state has adopted rules of evidence that mirror the framework and
general approach of the Federal Rules of Evidence.98
94. See David L. Faigmen et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Courthouse Door, Please:
Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of Scientific Evi-
dence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1800 (1994) (“Since the earliest days of the use of expert
witnesses, judges (and more recently legislatures) have struggled to design the juridical inter-
section where law and science cross paths.” (footnote omitted)).
95. See id. (noting that courts have not met with much success in devising a proper rule
that would end the struggle over the admissibility of expert testimony); Lee M. Friedman, Ex-
pert Testimony, Its Abuse and Reformation, 19 YALE L.J. 247, 247 (1910) (“[T]here is a con-
stant complaining and mistrust on the part of judges, juries and lawyers of the expert witness.”).
96. For example, the testimony of a physicist or chemist explaining how or why a spark
plug works is far different from the testimony of an auto mechanic regarding normal and ab-
normal wear on a spark-plug. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1436 n.6
(11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub nom. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998).
[A discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent disposition of this case has been added to Part
III.D.]
97. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”).
98. The Uniform Rules of Evidence are almost identical to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
See FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE app. I, at 277 (West 1998). The states that have adopted
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, in whole or in part, include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colo-
rado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. See id. at 278.
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A. The General Tests of Relevancy, Probativity, and Prejudice
The Federal Rules of Evidence, like every set of evidentiary
rules, attempt to provide a framework in which fairness and effi-
ciency dictate what evidence may be used in the truth-seeking proc-
ess of litigation.99 Federal Rule 402 provides for the admission of all
relevant evidence100 as a general matter.101 Federal Rule 403 tempers
the openness of Rule 402’s relevancy requirement by excluding rele-
vant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.”102
B. The Rule for Expert Testimony
Rule 403 also addresses the concern that the jury will be misled
or distracted by confusing or duplicative evidence.103 The Rule’s con-
cern with possible prejudice encompasses the fear that the jury will
99. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in admini-
stration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and devel-
opment of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings
justly determined.”).
100. Relevant evidence is defined as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 401.
101. See FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise pro-
vided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not
relevant is not admissible.”).
102. FED. R. EVID. 403. Rule 403 recognizes that evidence which is relevant may nonethe-
less possess certain risks and disadvantages which justify its exclusion. See 1 MICHAEL H.
GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.1, at 247 (4th ed. 1996). However, exclu-
sion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is disfavored and should be “employed sparingly as it
is an extraordinary remedy.” Id. at 248. Furthermore, the objecting party carries the burden of
showing the likelihood that the prejudice caused by the evidence will outweigh its probative
value. See id. at 248-49. When determining the admissibility of evidence under Rule 403, the
judge should consider, among other factors, the importance of the fact for which the evidence is
being offered, whether the fact for which the evidence is being offered is in dispute, and the
potential effectiveness of a limiting jury instruction pursuant to Rule 105. See id. at 249-51.
Rule 105 provides that “[w]hen evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose
but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon re-
quest, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” FED. R.
EVID. 105.
103. See FED. R. EVID. 403 (providing that relevant evidence may also be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by “confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence”); 1 GRAHAM, supra note 102, § 403.1, at 259 (suggesting that “the concept of misleading
the jury refers primarily to the possibility of the jury overvaluing the probative value of a par-
ticular item of evidence for any reason other than the emotional reaction associated with unfair
prejudice”).
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overvalue certain kinds of evidence.104 When testimony is presented
as specialized or scientific expert testimony, the potential for over-
valuation is heightened. Whether it is because of “the aura of sci-
ence” or “the prestige of the expert,” the concern is that the jury will
give too much weight to the expert testimony even though the un-
derlying scientific basis for that testimony is only moderately help-
ful.105 Rule 702 reiterates the balancing inquiry of Rule 403 and re-
quires the expert’s evidence to be helpful to the trier of fact.106
Implicit in Rule 702’s helpfulness requirement is the understanding
that where the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its
risk of prejudice, the evidence does not assist the trier of fact. Rule
702 provides: “If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.”107
The United States Supreme Court’s seminal interpretation of
Rule 702 can be found in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.108 In Daubert, the Court reaffirmed the role of the trial judge as a
“gatekeeper” who is ultimately responsible for preventing the jury
from receiving expert testimony based upon “[c]onjectures that are
probably wrong.”109 To guide the trial court judge in her gatekeeping
duties, the Court attempted to give meaning to the words “scientific”
and “knowledge” in Rule 702.110 Noting that “‘scientific’ implies a
grounding in the methods and procedures of science,” and that
“‘knowledge’ connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation,” the Court defined four primary inquiries which the trial
judge should make to determine whether the expert based his testi-
104. See 1 GRAHAM, supra note 102, § 403.1, at 259 (“To illustrate, evidence of the results
of a lie detector, even where an attempt is made to explain fully the significance of the results,
is likely to be overvalued by the trier of fact.”).
105. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Garcia, 588 A.2d 951, 955 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (“Jurors
are human and may be unduly impressed by an expert, his credentials, and ultimately his
opinion, ‘even though, upon reflection, they would realize that in the particular field under dis-
cussion they are as much at home as the expert.’” (citation omitted)).
106. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
107. Id.
108. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
109. Id. at 597.
110. See id. at 589-90. The Court offered no guidance regarding how to evaluate the phrase
“technical or other specialized knowledge” found in Rule 702. See id. at 590 n.8.
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mony on “scientific” knowledge.111 These inquiries are: (1) whether
the scientific theory has been tested; (2) whether it has been subject
to peer review and publication; (3) its known potential rate of error;
and (4) whether it is generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community.112 Since the Court’s decision in Daubert, the Rule 702 in-
quiry applied by lower courts has evolved into “a difficult two-part
analysis”113 that involves an inquiry into the scientific knowledge and
method underlying the testimony, as well as a basic inquiry of rele-
vance.114
Before the federal courts adopted the current Daubert approach
to expert testimony, they relied heavily on an influential federal court
of appeals decision: United States v. Frye.115 In Frye, the court articu-
lated a common law standard different from the Federal Rules-based
standard that was later adopted by the Supreme Court in Daubert.
The “Frye test,” as it became known, reflects the distress felt by the
court over the admission of novel or unproven scientific evidence:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the par-
ticular field in which it belongs.116
Though Rule 702 and Daubert have since replaced Frye as the appro-
priate standard for expert testimony in federal courts, the Frye test
has survived in many state courts.117 Some other state courts, though
111. Id.
112. See id. at 593-94.
113. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995).
114. See id.
115. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
116. Id. at 1014.
117. See, e.g., Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577 (Fla. 1997) (reaffirming the use of the
Frye test as the standard for admitting novel scientific evidence); People v. White, 645 N.Y.S.2d
662, 564 (App. Div. 1996) (holding that the Frye test is still applicable in New York, but that it
was not necessary in the particular case because the expert testimony was offered to explain
symptoms of child sexual abuse generally and not to prove actual abuse); State v. Zeiler, Nos.
33023-3-1, 37181-9-1, 1997 WL 88960, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1997) (applying Frye to
sophisticated or technical scientific matters). It seems likely that the Frye rule persists largely
because it was the “dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evi-
dence” for at least 70 years. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585. The rule established in Frye is attractive
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not bound to do so, have chosen to adopt the standard articulated in
Daubert.118 Thus, although the text of the various state rules may be
nearly identical, the state approaches to expert testimony vary
widely.
C. The Different “Sciences” and Expert Testimony
Most expert testimony is based on the scientific method. In-
creasingly, however, experts trained in social science are being used
in American courtrooms, and these witnesses do not uniformly rely
upon the scientific method as the basis for their testimony.119 A curi-
ous problem arises, then, when expert testimony is not grounded in
the scientific method. The problem arises out of the fact that both the
Frye and Daubert approaches to expert testimony are based upon
scientific method principles, principles that are not always compatible
with social science.
The scientific method has its roots in Newtonian methodology,
named for the specific experimental method used by Sir Isaac New-
ton to derive his laws of mechanics.120 Newton’s scientific method re-
quires a scientist to form a hypothesis and to engage in experimenta-
tion or observation in order to affirm or reject the validity of the
hypothesis.121 Newton’s systemization of the experimental technique
and his standardization of terminology such as “hypothesis” has
caused his work to be regarded as “‘the model of scientific’ re-
search”122 or, more simply, the scientific method. As a result, some
judges are only willing to recognize knowledge as “scientific” if it de-
rives its “validity” from objective techniques.123 Objectivity, as under-
                                                                                                                                     
because its requirement of “general acceptance” appears to establish a clear and easily fol-
lowed bright-line rule. However, application of this standard is far from simple. For example,
there is no easy way to determine what constitutes “scientific” evidence. See Myers et al., supra
note 19, at 24.
118. See, e.g., State v. Nemeth, 694 N.E.2d 1332, 1339 (Ohio 1998) (evaluating reliability
using the four factors designated by Daubert); Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568, 573 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992) (rejecting Frye and applying a standard similar to that later articulated in Daubert).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329, 1330 (9th Cir. 1997) (treating the
testimony of a rebuttal expert in child sexual abuse as specialized knowledge derived from ex-
perience, rather than as scientific knowledge).
120. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Next Step After Daubert: Developing a Similarly
Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2271, 2276 (1994).
121. See id.
122. Id. at 2276-77 (quoting 5 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 490-91 (Paul Edwards
ed., 1967)).
123. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
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stood by these judges, requires testing the hypothesis under con-
trolled conditions so that other scientists may replicate the experi-
ments and thereby test the methodology and ascertain a rate of er-
ror.124 The reason for requiring replicability can largely be traced to
the concern that the opposing party, through its own expert, should
be able to “both identify any obvious errors and replicate the ex-
periment to expose latent deficiencies,”125 thus reducing the likeli-
hood that false results will be reported and a false hypothesis ac-
cepted as proven.
Limiting the definition of “science” to the Newtonian or experi-
mental methodology implicitly creates a second, separate field of
knowledge composed of the information gained through observation
in the absence of controlled experimentation.126 Though the conclu-
sions of this other science, or “non-science” as one court has termed
it,127 are not inherently less valid than those of Newtonian science, its
basis in subjective observation defies the systematic testing and repli-
cability requirements of Newtonian science.128 For example, an expe-
rienced auto mechanic may possess an abundance of knowledge re-
garding the markings of normal wear and tear on spark plugs.129 This
knowledge and understanding probably derives from the mechanic’s
years of experience and observation and not from the practice of
testing spark plugs in a laboratory.130 The mechanic may have no un-
derstanding of the general Newtonian principles of physics or chemis-
try and thus no “scientific” methodology from which he draws his
124. See Imwinkelried, supra note 120, at 2280 (noting that if the reliability of scientific re-
search is in question, a second scientist can duplicate the experiment, creating a double-check
process usually absent in nonscientific testimony).
125. Id. (footnote omitted).
126. Cf. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2033 (1993) (defining
“scientific method” as a method of research requiring “the recognition and formulation of a
problem, the collection of data through observation and if possible experiment, the formulation
of hypotheses, and the testing and confirmation of the hypotheses formulated” (emphasis
added)).
127. “Non-science” is the term used by the court in Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131
F.3d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub nom. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 118 S.
Ct. 2339 (1998). [A discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent disposition of this case has been
added to Part III.D.]
128. See Myers et al., supra note 19, at 20 (observing that judges are more comfortable with
medical evidence than behavioral science evidence because medical evidence is based on data
verifiable by objective techniques).
129. See Carmichael, 131 F.3d at 1436 n.6 (drawing a detailed analogy between a me-
chanic’s analysis of spark plug burns and a tire expert’s evaluation of an allegedly defective
tire).
130. See id.
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conclusions, but this expert’s experience-based conclusions may be
valid nonetheless.131
In the same way that an auto mechanic’s experience with spark
plugs may qualify the mechanic to provide information about wear
and tear, the clinical or field experiences of a behavioral scientist,
such as a psychiatrist, psychologist, or even a certified social worker,
may be useful to a jury in understanding human behavior. Such a be-
havioral scientist may observe the workings of a child’s mind in an at-
tempt to ascertain what kind of damage is present, where it lies, and
how it may be repaired.132
Because experience-based knowledge is neither created nor
tested according to the traditional Newtonian scientific method,133 it
does not easily conform to the standards of Daubert or Frye,134 which
were created according to a Newtonian science paradigm. Despite
the differences in the nature of Newtonian and social science and the
incompatibility of the Newtonian standards of both Daubert and Frye
with social science, many courts continue to apply the Newtonian
paradigm to social science expert testimony.135 Not surprisingly, when
social science-based testimony is subjected to the Frye test or to the
Daubert factors, that testimony fails either standard.136 This is so be-
cause, according to the Newtonian method, a sound theory will be
testable and should show a rate of error.137 The results of repeated
tests and the rate of error for those tests will determine whether the
theory is worthy of publication and whether others in the community
are willing to accept the theory as the likely truth.138 Because human
behavior is so difficult to replicate, behavioral science theory is fre-
131. See id.
132. See generally HENRY GLEITMAN, PSYCHOLOGY 772-78 (4th ed. 1995) (describing how
psychotherapy may be useful in understanding human behavior).
133. Social scientists, like “hard” scientists, do observe and record patterns of behavior; the
difference is the lack of control over all of the variables. See JOHN J. SHAUGHNESSY &
EUGENE B. ZECHMEISTER, RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY 10-11 (4th ed. 1997). Cer-
tain kinds of social science experiments may be impossible to replicate identically because no
two individuals, nor their reactions, are exactly alike. See id.
134. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text (discussing the Frye and Daubert stan-
dards for the admissibility of expert testimony).
135. See infra Part IV.A (analyzing the treatment of social science testimony in child sexual
abuse prosecutions in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and South Dakota).
136. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the rejection of valid social science expert testimony in
child sexual abuse prosecutions in Pennsylvania and Kentucky as well as the South Dakota Su-
preme Court’s inappropriate manipulation of the Frye test in order to admit such testimony).
137. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
138. See id.
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quently nontestable,139 making it impossible to calculate rates of er-
ror. Furthermore, social science methodology may permit the coexis-
tence of numerous contradictory theories without a requirement that
the reliability of one disproves the reliability of another.140
The tendency of courts to analyze most expert testimony under
Rule 702’s “scientific” knowledge provision, and therefore apply
some version of Frye or Daubert, has resulted in a notable failure to
treat the expert testimony of behavioral scientists as either
“technical” or “specialized” knowledge under the Rule and its state
counterparts.141 Admittedly, many social science conclusions are
based upon hypotheses that may be tested and often refuted but that
can never be absolutely “proven” through the systematic accumula-
tion of evidence in support of a particular proposition. Social science
theories relied upon by behavioral scientists can only suggest the
most logical conclusion to be drawn from the data.142 Thus, using the
“technical” and “specialized” knowledge provisions of Rule 702 to
admit such evidence would be more appropriate because the knowl-
edge is gained from experience and observation rather than from the
distinctly Newtonian technique of hypothesis and testing.
D. Recognition of the Problem: the Eleventh Circuit
A federal court of appeals recently recognized the problem of
analyzing experience-based expertise within the Daubert framework.
In Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc.,143 the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that “‘[t]he distinction between scien-
139. See G.C. HELMSTADLER, RESEARCH CONCEPTS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 15-16 (1970).
Indeed, the only truly “scientific” method of testing whether, for example, a “child abuse syn-
drome” actually predicts the occurrence of sexual abuse would be to subject children to abuse
and compare their reactions to a control group of non-abused children. Obviously such a study
would be unethical.
140. For example, multiple theories are accepted as valid in modern psychology, including
the Freudian, cognitive, behavioral, and organic theories. See generally GLEITMAN, supra note
132, at 764-96 (discussing the general premise behind each theory).
141. Recall, “technical” and “specialized” are the other two areas of expertise provided for
by FED. R. EVID. 702.
142. See, e.g., Myers et al., supra note 19, at 70 (noting that because “it is not possible to
‘know’ whether a child was abused . . . expert testimony on whether abuse occurred rests on
assessment of a wide range of information leading to a clinical judgment that sexual abuse is
the most likely explanation in particular cases”).
143. 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub nom. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,
118 S. Ct. 2339 (1998). [For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent disposition of this case,
see infra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.]
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tific and non-scientific expert testimony is a critical one.’”144 Holding
that the testimony of an expert in car “tire failure” did not constitute
“scientific” testimony under Rule 702, the court identified a separate
category of “non-scientific” expert testimony.145 The court observed
that the expert made “no pretense of basing his opinion on any scien-
tific theory” but instead “rest[ed] his opinion on his experience in
analyzing failed tires.”146 This court’s distinction between Newtonian
science and experiential expertise is significant not because it was a
novel distinction,147 but because the court directly challenged the ap-
144. Id. at 1435 (quoting Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994)).
145. Id. at 1436.
146. Id. (emphasis added).
147. Other federal courts have recognized the problem with applying Daubert to behavioral
science testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding that an expert’s testimony regarding the modus operandi of drug traffickers was based
on specialized, but not scientific, knowledge); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349-50
(6th Cir. 1994) (noting that Daubert principles regarding the admission of scientific evidence do
not apply to a deputy sheriff’s nonscientific testimony concerning a police shooting). In fact, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has even ruled on the issue in the context
of child sexual abuse prosecutions. See United States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329, 1330 (9th Cir.
1997) (per curiam) (stating that “Daubert’s tests for the admissibility of expert scientific testi-
mony do not require exclusion of expert testimony that involves specialized knowledge rather
than scientific theory” in a child sexual abuse prosecution). However, because Bighead is a fed-
eral case, its influence is likely to be limited in child sexual abuse prosecutions, which arise
most frequently in state courts. In a per curiam opinion in Bighead, the Ninth Circuit held that
the admission of expert testimony from a rebuttal witness was proper where the witness had
been called after “the victim’s ability to recall and to recount the incidents of sexual abuse vig-
orously had been challenged on cross examination.” Id. The court held that the testimony was
proper because the expert:
did not testify about the facts of this case, or about the particular victim, whom she
never examined. Rather, she testified to about “delayed disclosure” and “script
memory” which are typical characteristics she has observed among the more than
1300 persons she has interviewed who say they are victims of child abuse.
Id. According to the court, the expert did not present “scientific testimony,” so her testimony
did not need to be evaluated under Daubert. See id. at 1330-31. The court held instead that be-
cause the expert’s testimony was based on her own observations “from many years experience
interviewing many, many persons,” the expert had presented “specialized knowledge, not sci-
entific knowledge.” Id. (citing United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997). The
court also rejected the contention that the testimony was improper. The court stated that, al-
though “the expert referred in passing to ‘studies, literature and specific syndromes’ . . . , [h]er
opinion was based on her own observations.” Id. (citation omitted). Lastly, the Ninth Circuit
justified its holding with the assertion that the expert testimony was highly probative and did
not constitute “improper buttressing” of the victim’s testimony. Id. at 1331. Though Bighead
deals precisely with the problem presented by this Note, it probably will not be of much use in
combating the problem addressed by this Note. The relatively recent nature of the opinion, its
brevity (it was per curiam), and its failure to attract the attention of the Supreme Court are
likely to prevent the case from having much influence in state courts.
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plicability of the Daubert criteria to “nonscientific” expertise.148
Though the Eleventh Circuit did not purport to create a new stan-
dard for “non-scientific” expert testimony that would apply in lieu of
Daubert, the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari presents the possi-
bility that the Court will devise a more appropriate standard by which
federal courts, and possibly some state courts, can analyze such
knowledge.149
[Just prior to publication, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling
of the Eleventh Circuit.150 The Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit’s
distinction between “scientific” and “non-scientific” expert testi-
mony151 and refused to create a new standard of admissibility for non-
148. Cf. United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that for the panel
to rule on the issue of admissibility, it had to “be confident that the district court applied the
Daubert framework”); Sorenson v. Robert B. Miller & Assocs., Inc., Nos. 95-5085, 95-5086,
1996 WL 515351, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 1996) (noting only that the difference between scien-
tific expert testimony and other forms of expert testimony “is sometimes overlooked” when
courts rely on Daubert).
The inquiry advocated by the Eleventh Circuit echoes the approach Michigan adopted in
People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 1990). See infra notes 211-20 and accompanying text
(discussing the holding in Beckley). Generally, that approach sees the judge’s gatekeeping role
as limited to insisting that evidence “assist the trier” of fact and be more probative than preju-
dicial. See Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 399.
149. Although the Carmichael court recognized the inappositeness of Newtonian-based
gatekeeping standards to experience-based expert testimony, it did not entirely reject the con-
cept of judicial “gatekeeping” of expert testimony. See Carmichael, 131 F.3d at 1436-37 (stating
that on remand the district court should still determine the reliability and relevancy of the prof-
fered expert testimony). In addition to reasserting the role of judicial gatekeeping, the Car-
michael court also reasserted the role of the adversarial process in keeping unreliable evidence
away from the jury:
Although the Court’s analysis in Daubert may suggest reliability issues for district
courts to consider as they determine whether proffered evidence is sufficiently reli-
able for admission under Rule 702, “the trial court’s role as gatekeeper is not in-
tended to serve as a replacement for the adversary system: ‘Vigorous cross-
examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the bur-
den of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admis-
sible evidence.’”
Id. at 1435 (citing United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th Cir.1996)
(quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993))). By declining to pro-
pose either a Frye-like rule by which all expert testimony is to be tested or a Daubert-like list of
evaluative factors according to which the reliability of nonscientific expert testimony must be
tested, the Eleventh Circuit seems to have retreated altogether from the idea of a “test” for the
validity of the evidence and has focused, instead, upon the underlying goal of Rule 702. See id.
at 1435-37.
150. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, No. 97-1709, 1999 WL 152455, at *15 (U.S. Mar.
23, 1999).
151. Compare id. at *8 (stating that the language of FED. R. EVID. 702 “makes no relevant
distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge”),
with Carmichael, 131 F.3d at 1435 (drawing a distinction between “scientific” and “non-
STEELE TO PRINTER.DOC 04/29/99  4:24 PM
960 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol 48:933
Newtonian expertise.152 Instead, the Court held that “Daubert’s gen-
eral holding—setting forth the trial judge’s general ‘gatekeeping’ ob-
ligation—applies not only to testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowl-
edge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other
specialized’ knowledge.”153 Relying upon its previous holding in
Daubert, the Court reiterated that a trial court “may,” rather than
must, rely upon one or more of the specific factors “mentioned” in
the Daubert decision.154 And though it refused to distinguish
“technical” and “other specialized” knowledge from “scientific”
knowledge, the Court reminded the district court that it has “the
same broad latitude when it decides how to determine reliability as it
enjoys in respect to its ultimate reliability determination.”155
The Court’s failure to recommend or create any additional fac-
tors which might be better suited for evaluating the reliability of non-
Newtonian knowledge156 does not, in itself, sound the death knell for
the development of a more appropriate admissibility standard for ex-
pertise based on non-Newtonian knowledge. The Court has reaf-
firmed the wide latitude federal district courts have to develop their
own standards for admitting expert testimony. Moreover, state
courts, where child sexual abuse prosecutions arise most frequently,
remain free to adopt their own approaches. Rather than subjecting all
expert testimony to Newtonian-based analysis, state courts may draw
from the differing approaches of the Eleventh Circuit in Carmichael
and the Supreme Court in Kumho Tire. Indeed, even those state
courts that have heretofore categorically applied the Daubert factors
to all expert testimony might reconsider their approaches to social
science expert testimony in light of Justice Scalia’s reminder that the
Daubert factors, with their Newtonian underpinnings, are “not holy
writ.”157]
                                                                                                                                     
scientific” expert testimony).
152. See Kumho Tire Co., 1999 WL 152455, at *9 (concluding that the general principles
already set out in Daubert apply to all expert testimony).
153. Id. at *4 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 702). The Court did concede that “the Court in
Daubert referred only to scientific knowledge.” Id. at *8 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.8 (1993)).
154. Id. at *4 (noting that “the test of reliability [in Daubert] is ‘flexible,’ and Daubert’s list
of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all experts or in every case”).
155. Id. at *4.
156. Instead of defining any new factors to be considered by lower courts, the Court em-
phasized that the Daubert factors were meant to be “helpful, not definitive” and therefore “do
not all necessarily apply even in every instance in which the reliability of scientific testimony is
challenged.” Id. at *10.
157. Id. at *15 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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IV. STATE PARADIGMS IN ACTION
The judiciary’s failure to consistently recognize the fundamental
differences between Newtonian science and social science, combined
with its further reluctance to consider the standards by which nonsci-
entific, experience-based expert testimony should be judged, has led
to inconsistent treatment of such evidence in different jurisdictions.158
Some states, like many federal courts, have attempted to pigeonhole
behavioral science into the category of “scientific” knowledge in or-
der to use the established Daubert or Frye body of law as a test for
admissibility.159 Behavioral science offered in child sexual abuse
prosecutions frequently is treated as if it were Newtonian science.160
As Section III.C explains, however, such treatment is inappropriate.161
158. See Carmichael v. Samyang Tire Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1435 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] scien-
tific expert is an expert who relies on the application of scientific principles, rather than on
skill- or experience-based observation, for the basis of his opinion.”); United States v. Hall, 93
F.3d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Social science in general, and psychological evidence in par-
ticular, have posed both analytical and practical difficulties for courts attempting to apply Rule
702 and Daubert.”); Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The courts
have had a difficult time in appropriately cabining the opinion testimony of ‘scientific’ experts. .
. . It would appear obvious, however, that evidentiary problems are exacerbated when courts
must deal with the even more elusive concept of non-scientific expert testimony.”); Sorenson v.
Robert B. Miller & Assocs., Nos. 95-5085, 95-5086, 1996 WL 515351, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 10,
1996) (“As this Court has recognized, however, Daubert is only of limited help in assessing
technical or experiential expertise.”). Compare Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991
(5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the proposition that Daubert is inapplicable to nonscientific testimony
because “experts who purport to rely on general engineering principles and practical experi-
ence might escape screening by the district court simply by stating that their conclusions were
not reached by any particular method or technique”), with Tyrus v. Urban Search Manage-
ment, 102 F.3d 256, 263-64 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that Daubert shall be applied to social sci-
ence-based testimony when the testimony is grounded in a particular methodology).
159. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the absolutist approaches of Pennsylvania, Kentucky,
and South Dakota).
160. See, e.g., People v. Housley, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431, 435-39 (Ct. App. 1992) (applying Frye
to the opinion of a psychologist); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577-81 (Fla. 1997) (same);
Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 695 (Ky. 1996) (applying Daubert to the opinion
testimony of a psychiatrist); Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1296 n.10 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1995) (applying Daubert to all scientific testimony, including opinion testimony given by psy-
chologists); State v. Cressey, 628 A.2d 696, 698 (N.H. 1993) (applying Frye and declining to
rule on whether or not Daubert will change the standard for scientific evidence in New Hamp-
shire in a challenge to testimony given by an expert in psychology and child sexual abuse);
Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d 655, 659-60 (Okla. 1991) (applying a Frye-like standard to opinion
testimony given by a psychologist); Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 832-36 (Pa. 1992)
(applying Frye to testimony given by an expert in child sexual abuse); State v. Schimpf, 782
S.W.2d 186, 194 (Tenn. 1989) (applying a state-law test which includes a Frye-type element to
opinion testimony given by a psychologist); Frenzel v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 747 (Wyo. 1993)
(applying a test which analyzes the “scientific basis” of the evidence to opinion testimony given
by a psychologist); see also Sciscoe v. State, 606 So. 2d 202, 204 (Ala. 1992) (applying the Frye
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The inability of experience-based behavioral science testimony
to “pass” the Frye or Daubert test has caused some jurisdictions to
adopt reactionary and overly restrictive gatekeeping practices that
exclude virtually all social science-based testimony in child sexual
abuse prosecutions.162 Of the jurisdictions applying Frye, Pennsylva-
nia has taken the most restrictive position—it refuses to admit expert
testimony concerning symptomology or syndrome evidence for any
purpose.163 Kentucky, which applies Daubert, has adopted the same
absolutist position as Pennsylvania.164 In contrast, a few jurisdictions,
such as California, Florida, Michigan, and Texas have adopted a
more pragmatic position that ignores the standards for “scientific”
evidence and focuses instead upon a Rule 401 relevancy inquiry and a
Rule 403 prejudice versus probativity inquiry.165
A. Absolutist Approaches
At least three jurisdictions have taken highly restrictive ap-
proaches to behavioral science evidence.166 These jurisdictions’ courts
are unyielding in their adherence to Newtonian-based paradigms de-
                                                                                                                                     
test to the opinion testimony of an expert in “child sexual abuse intervention,” though recog-
nizing that the great need for the testimony requires more of a balancing inquiry); Goodson v.
Mississippi, 566 So. 2d 1142, 1144-48 (Miss. 1990) (reciting a Frye-type rule and applying it to
the opinion testimony of an expert in child sexual abuse, though recognizing the need to treat
social science distinctly).
161. The result of this inappropriate treatment is a hodgepodge of approaches to the intro-
duction of behavioral science expert testimony. A discussion of the judicial treatment of expert
testimony of the kind described in Part II can be confusing. First, not all of the states have pub-
lished an opinion on the issue. Second, comparison between states can be difficult because not
all of the states have adopted rules of evidence modeled after the federal rules, although a
majority have done so. See supra note 98. Among the states that do in fact follow the general
standard of Federal Rule 702, many of the states that still apply Frye have not ruled on the is-
sue since the 1993 Daubert decision. See, e.g., Cressey, 628 A.2d at 698 (applying Frye to de-
termine the admissibility of expert qualifications and reliability and declining to state whether
the holding in Daubert will affect the Frye standard). And even where a state has made a post-
Daubert ruling on the issue, it is difficult to predict whether the state will continue to adhere to
Frye, will follow the federal application of Daubert, or will devise a wholly new standard of
admissibility.
162. See, e.g., Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 696 (excluding all behavioral science testimony in
child sexual abuse prosecutions); Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 836 (same).
163. See Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 836.
164. See Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 695-96.
165. See People v. Harlan, 271 Cal. Rptr. 653, 656 (Ct. App. 1990); Hadden, 690 So. 2d at
577-80; People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 404 (Mich. 1990); Frohne v. State, 928 S.W.2d 570,
574-75 (Tex. 1996).
166. See Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 695-96; Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 834-35; State v. Bachman, 446
N.W.2d 271, 276 (S.D. 1989).
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spite the non-Newtonian nature of the evidence.167 Although the
courts in both Pennsylvania and South Dakota have addressed the is-
sue within Frye’s common law Newtonian paradigm, the two states
have reached opposite results: Pennsylvania’s courts exclude this type
of testimony while South Dakota’s courts allow it.168 In contrast, Ken-
tucky’s highest court purports to apply a more modern standard
based on the logic of the Federal Rules but still refuses to acknowl-
edge the distinction between Newtonian and non-Newtonian based
knowledge.169 The result of Kentucky’s tunnel vision with regard to
behavioral science testimony in child sexual abuse prosecutions is a
flat refusal to consider any non-Newtonian expert testimony. To-
gether, these three jurisdictions—Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and South
Dakota—illustrate how a rigid application of Frye and/or Daubert
standards to behavioral science expert testimony can lead to inconsis-
tent outcomes, some of which are overly restrictive. These absolutist
approaches result in either a total rejection of useful and proper tes-
timony or a blanket acceptance of the testimony justified by an out-
come-oriented misapplication of the Frye or Daubert standards.
1. Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Dunkle,170 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court applied the state’s common law rules of
evidence (rather than a statutory set of rules) and determined that all
behavioral science expert testimony offered in child sexual abuse
prosecutions is inadmissible.171 In Dunkle, the court examined expert
testimony that related the behavioral patterns of sexually abused
children to the framework of CSAS.172 Despite the fact that the expert
in that case did not attempt to “relate any of her testimony to the
child in question,”173 the court applied Frye, which is Pennsylvania’s
standard of admissibility for expert scientific testimony.174 The court
167. See Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 695-96; Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 832; Bachman, 446 N.W.2d at
276.
168. Compare Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 835 (excluding behavioral science testimony), with
Bachman, 446 N.W.2d at 276 (admitting behavioral science testimony).
169. See Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 696.
170. 602 A.2d 830 (Pa. 1992).
171. See id. at 836.
172. See id. at 832-36.
173. Id. at 831.
174. Although Pennsylvania has no codified rule of evidence which governs the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony, it has long been faithful to the Frye standard. See Commonwealth v.
Topa, 369 A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. 1977) (“Admissibility of the evidence depends upon the general
acceptance of its validity by those scientists active in the field to which the evidence belongs.”);
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applied this standard to the testimony regarding CSAS on the
rationale that the “syndrome is an attempt to construct a diagnostic
or behavioral profile about sexually abused children.”175 Predictably,
CSAS failed to meet Frye’s general acceptance criterion.176 But the
court proceeded beyond an analysis of mere reliability and concluded
that the expert’s listing of behavioral patterns was not even relevant
because the patterns could neither be identified as “abuse-specific”
nor limited expressly to sexually abused children.177
In addition, the court reviewed the admissibility of testimony
concerning delays and omissions in reporting child sexual abuse.178
Again, the Pennsylvania court applied the Frye standard and further
articulated a requirement that the subject matter of the expert testi-
mony must provide information “beyond the knowledge or experi-
ence of the average layman.”179 The Dunkle court then ruled that the
testimony offered to explain delays and inconsistencies was not help-
ful to the jury because the reasons offered by the expert for delays or
inconsistencies “are easily understood by lay people and do not re-
quire expert analysis.”180
                                                                                                                                     
Commonwealth ex rel. Riccio v. Dilworth, 115 A.2d 865, 866-67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955). The Frye
standard continues to be the applicable standard of admissibility in Pennsylvania for expert
scientific testimony. See Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 705 A.2d 1314, 1325 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1997):
Therefore, the gatekeeping role of the court, far from detracting from the jury’s func-
tion, is in fact essential to it: scientific methodology and conclusions must initially be
scrutinized by the court to ensure that what might appear to the jury to be science is
not in fact speculation in disguise. Properly supported scientific evidence, however
complex, can then reach the jury for its consideration, while material whose com-
plexity merely hides its unreliability is winnowed out. This is, in essence, the teaching
of Frye, and that teaching remains valid.
Id.
175. Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 832.
176. See id. at 832-36.
177. See id. at 832-34.
178. See id. at 836-38.
179. Id. at 836; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (“When opinions are
excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of time.”
(citation omitted)).
180. Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 836. Three justices dissented from the Dunkle majority because
they disagreed with the contention that the jury did not need the assistance of expert testimony
to fully understand the child’s behavior. See id. at 839-40 (McDermott, J., dissenting in part); id.
at 844 (Larsen, J., dissenting, Papadakos, J., joining). They argued instead that the subject of
child sexual abuse was “shrouded in myth and shame . . . about which the average citizen/juror
knows little or nothing” and that it was, therefore, an error to “completely rule[] out the use of
expert testimony.” Id. at 840 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Notably, the disagreement between the
majority and dissent was based not on an interpretation of a legal standard but on the judicial
perception of the needs and experiences of the lay members of society who comprise the jury.
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2. Kentucky. In a similar vein, Kentucky’s supreme court has also
adopted an approach that excludes behavioral science testimony in
child sexual abuse cases. Kentucky’s decision in Newkirk v.
Commonwealth181 to follow the lead of Pennsylvania is particularly
interesting because, unlike Pennsylvania, Kentucky’s code of
evidence mirrors the Federal Rules and does not rely solely upon the
common law.182
In Newkirk, the testimony presented by the prosecution’s expert
included only a general list of common reactions and symptoms of
abuse that were not classified as a particular syndrome183 and an ex-
planation of the “‘phenomenon’ of recantation”184 which was not di-
rectly applied to the case.185 Despite the fact that the expert did not
offer any direct testimony about whether the complainant had been
abused,186 the Kentucky court refused to admit the testimony because,
in the court’s view, the testimony amounted to an inappropriate di-
agnostic use of CSAAS.187 Though the Newkirk court asserted that
CSAAS, offered for any use, would fail to meet the standards set
forth in either Frye or Daubert, the court ultimately excluded the evi-
dence on the grounds that it was not even relevant under Rule 403 of
the Kentucky Rules of Evidence.188
The Kentucky court’s holding resulted from the majority’s fail-
ure to distinguish between the various uses for which expert testi-
mony can be offered.189 The three dissenting judges in Newkirk best
summarized the majority’s failure:
Unfortunately, the majority opinion fails to distinguish between the
general prohibition of the admissibility of expert testimony relating
181. 937 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1996).
182. See id. at 695-96.
183. See id. at 691; see also supra Part II.A (describing the types of social science testimony
offered).
184. Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 691 (quoting the unpublished opinion of the trial court).
185. See id. at 693-96.
186. See id. at 691. Even with the possibility of a limiting instruction that the “evidence was
for ‘the limited purpose of explaining the psychological dynamics surrounding a recantation
following an accusation of sexual abuse,’” the court would not admit any of the expert testi-
mony offered by the prosecution. Id. (quoting the trial court).
187. See id. (discussing Bussey v. Commonwealth, 697 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Ky. 1985), in which
the court concluded that CSAAS “was not generally accepted in the medical community, and
that the expert was unable to connect the victim’s symptoms with the [defendant] rather than
some other person”).
188. See id. at 695.
189. See id. at 697.
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to CSAAS and rebuttal testimony regarding the phenomenon of re-
cantation. . . . “This witness is being called to testify for the limited
purpose of explaining the psychological dynamics surrounding a re-
cantation following an accusation of the sexual abuse. This evidence
is not offered for the purpose of proving whether [the victim] was or
was not sexually abused.”190
Notwithstanding the absence of any prosecution attempt to present
social science testimony that diagnosed the complainant as abused,191
a majority of the court in Dunkle excluded all testimony regarding
commonly observed behavior in abused children.192 The majority jus-
tified its rejection of syndrome testimony in part by stating that “the
overwhelmingly persuasive nature of such testimony” might effec-
tively dominate the jury’s decisionmaking process.193 Again, the ap-
plication of the rigid gatekeeping tests (Frye/Daubert), which insist
that if the science is not Newtonian it is not relevant, led to a rejec-
tion of otherwise useful expert testimony that would not have in-
truded upon the jury’s realm of determining credibility.
3. South Dakota. On the other end of the spectrum, the South
Dakota Supreme Court in State v. Bachman194 used the reasoning
endorsed by the Dunkle dissenters.195 Despite a heavy reliance upon
the language of Frye, the court in Bachman held that expert
testimony “concerning traits and characteristics typically found in
sexually abused children, characteristics or emotional conditions
190. Id. (Willett, Special Justice, dissenting) (quoting the trial court).
191. See id. (“Before beginning the substance of his testimony the child psychiatrist made
clear to the jury that he had not treated the victim and that he was not there to give an opinion
on whether or not she had been abused.”).
192. See id.
193. Id. at 691. Because of its effects on admissibility, it is important to note additionally
here that the Kentucky Rules of Evidence differ slightly from the Federal Rules of Evidence in
that Kentucky has not adopted the equivalent of Federal Rule 704, which overrules the com-
mon law prohibition against expert testimony expressing an opinion on the ultimate issue in the
case. See id. at 694.
194. 446 N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1989).
195. Compare id. at 274-77 (asserting that expert testimony in a child sexual abuse prosecu-
tion can help the jury to understand matters that are normally beyond a “layman’s breadth of
knowledge.” Id. at 275), with Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 839-40 (Pa. 1992)
(McDermott, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that not allowing expert testimony “trivializes an
entire field of clinical psychology” because it assumes that jurors understand why victims omit
details), and id. at 844 (Larsen, J. dissenting, Papadakos, J., joining) (arguing that without an
expert’s explanation of child sexual abuse, jurors might infer from certain actions of the victim
that he or she is not credible).
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observed in the victims, and opinion testimony that the victim’s
allegations were truthful” should be admissible.196 Although the
holding in Bachman was expressly based upon the court’s
determination that the expert testimony “[met] the requirements of
the Frye test,” the opinion does not make any citations to direct
evidence of general acceptance.197 Rather, the only justification for
the court’s position appears to be that the jury may not be able to
understand the “puzzling aspects” of an abused child’s conduct
without the assistance of expert testimony.198
B. Modifying Traditional Gatekeeping Tests
The Kentucky and Pennsylvania courts began with two assump-
tions that necessarily colored their subsequent analyses. First, these
two jurisdictions assumed that the expert’s testimony must be treated
as “scientific” testimony when analyzing the reliability of the exper-
tise.199 Second, both courts refused to recognize a need to correct
misperceptions about a child’s reaction to sexual abuse which may be
common among lay-people.200 Although South Dakota’s court al-
lowed the testimony, the approach of that state’s courts is equally
lamentable because the court improperly applied the traditional tests.
At least four jurisdictions that follow codes of evidence equivalent to
the Federal Rules have parted company with Pennsylvania, Ken-
tucky, and South Dakota and have recognized that behavioral science
testimony is unlike other scientific evidence.201 These four jurisdic-
196. Bachman, 446 N.W.2d at 276.
197. Id.
198. Id. (“Background data providing relevant insight into the puzzling aspects of the
child’s conduct and demeanor which the jury could not otherwise bring to its evaluation of her
credibility is helpful and appropriate in cases of sexual abuse of children.” (quoting State v.
Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984))).
199. See Newkirk v. Commonwealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Ky. 1996) (“[T]his Court has not
accepted the view that the CSAAS or any of its components has attained general acceptance in
the scientific community justifying its admission into evidence.”); Dunkle, 602 A.2d at 832
(“The existence of [CSAS] as either a generally accepted diagnostic tool or as relevant evi-
dence is not supportable.”).
200. See Newkirk, 937 S.W.2d at 696 (“While . . . a child may be timid and halting, we en-
trust to the wisdom of the twelve men and women who comprise the jury the responsibility to
sort between the conflicting versions of the events and arrive at a proper verdict.”); Dunkle,
602 A.2d at 837 (“[T]he reasonable explanations for why children do not come forward are well
within the range of common experience; reasons that are understood by the jury.”).
201. See People v. Harlan, 271 Cal. Rptr. 653, 657-59 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting the difference
between the procedures used in the physical sciences and the theories that ground the behav-
ioral sciences); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 577-581 (Fla. 1997) (same); People v. Beckley,
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tions are more likely to permit appropriate uses of social science ex-
pert testimony; they also preserve the integrity of Frye and Daubert
for instances where their application is appropriate.
1. The First Step: Distinguishing Scientific Testimony from
Experience-Based Testimony. California, Florida, and Texas differ in
the first instance from those jurisdictions that apply Frye or Daubert
to behavioral science expert testimony because each of these three
jurisdictions has rejected the notion that all social science expert
testimony should be treated as “science.” Rather, the courts in these
states have drawn a distinction between expertise that is based solely
upon the experience of the expert and expertise that is based upon
experience as well as knowledge of clinical studies performed by
third parties.202 The Florida Supreme Court effectively explained this
distinction:
[T]he Frye standard for admissibility of scientific evidence is not ap-
plicable to an expert’s pure opinion testimony which is based solely
on the expert’s training and experience. While an expert’s pure
opinion testimony comes cloaked with the expert’s credibility, the
jury can evaluate this testimony in the same way that it evaluates
other opinion or factual testimony. When determining the admissi-
bility of this kind of expert-opinion testimony which is personally
developed through clinical experience, the trial court must deter-
mine admissibility on the qualifications of the expert and the appli-
cable provisions of the evidence code. We differentiate pure opinion
testimony based upon clinical experience from profile and syndrome
evidence because profile and syndrome evidence rely on conclusions
based upon studies and tests.203
All three jurisdictions rely upon the substantial equivalent of Federal
Rule 702 to govern the admission of expert testimony, but only Flor-
ida and California courts have continued to use the Frye test to inter-
                                                                                                                                     
456 N.W.2d 391, 404 (Mich. 1990) (same); Frohne v. State, 928 S.W.2d 570, 574-75 (Tex. 1996)
(same).
202. See Harlan, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 657-58 (holding that the Kelly/Frye test for expert testi-
mony about a new scientific technique does not apply to evidence derived from an expert’s
clinical experience); Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 580 (differentiating between “pure opinion testi-
mony based upon clinical experience” and “profile and syndrome evidence” that relies on
studies and tests); Frohne, 928 S.W.2d at 574-75 (contrasting novel scientific evidence with tes-
timony based on an expert’s years of experience in working with sexually abused children).
203. Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 579-80 (citations omitted).
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pret their Rule 702-like provisions.204 The courts of both of these
states have concluded that the first-hand nature of the psychologist’s
or social worker’s social science expertise removes the testimony
from the category of “new scientific technique” that would otherwise
require the application of Frye.205 And although Texas courts pur-
portedly adhere to Daubert’s interpretation of Rule 702, they too
have determined that experience-based testimony does not constitute
a “novel scientific theory” (a phrase borrowed from Frye) and should
not be treated as such.206
The distinction made in these three states is significant in that
these state courts have recognized a difference between “scientific”
and “technical” or other “specialized” knowledge and, therefore,
have recognized a difference in the analysis or “test” for admission
that should be applied. The approach of these courts presents one
model for the treatment of non-Newtonian evidence: courts should
limit testimony to first-hand knowledge. This approach, however, is
not wholly satisfactory because it has the potential to exclude a sub-
stantial amount of credible second-hand published data which may
not qualify as Newtonian science.207
2. One Step Further: Distinguishing Social Science from Newto-
nian Science. Like the courts in California, Florida and Texas, the
Supreme Court of Michigan has made the important realization that
knowledge and expertise gained through observation rather than
through controlled scientific experimentation cannot be analyzed ac-
204. See FLA. R. EVID. 702; Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 579-80; Harlan, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 657-68
(applying its “Kelly/Frye” general acceptance test and stating that a “person may testify as an
expert if he or she has the ‘special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient
to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.’” (quoting CAL. EVID.
CODE § 720, California’s equivalent to FED. R. EVID. 702).
205. Harlan, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 657; see also Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 579-80 (“[T]he Frye stan-
dard for admissibility of scientific evidence is not applicable to an expert’s pure opinion testi-
mony which is based solely on the expert’s training and experience.”).
206. Frohne, 928 S.W.2d at 574. Having removed social science expert testimony from the
strict confines of “scientific” analysis, all three jurisdictions have found the testimony relevant
because they, unlike Kentucky and Pennsylvania, have recognized the need to rebut juror mis-
conceptions about the victim’s behavior. Id. at 574-75 (quoting Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817
(Tex. Crim. App. 1993)); accord Harlan, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 658; Hadden, 690 So. 2d at 580.
207. For example, this approach would exclude any testimony offered by an expert that
referred to CSAAS or PTSD because these syndromes reflect the research and observations of
other experts.
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cording to the criteria for Newtonian knowledge.208 However, Michi-
gan’s highest court has gone beyond this realization and has recog-
nized the potential validity of more than just first-hand information.
It has distinguished the methods of behavioral scientists and Newto-
nian scientists and recognized the legitimacy of each:
“Psychologists, when called as experts, do not talk about things or
objects; they talk about people. They do not dehumanize people
with whom they deal by treating them as objects composed of inter-
acting biological systems. Rather they speak of the whole person.”
Thus, it is difficult to fit the behavioral professions within the appli-
cation and definition of Davis/Frye.209
The Michigan court recognized that behavioral science testimony is
unlike other forms of scientific testimony and therefore cannot be
tested by the same standard.210
Thus, while Michigan can be grouped with California, Florida,
and Texas in that it refuses to treat the testimony at issue as tradi-
tional “scientific testimony,” the Michigan approach goes one step
further. The Michigan court realized in Beckley that there are
“fundamental differences between techniques and procedures based
on chemical, biological, or other physical sciences as contrasted with
theories and assumptions that are based on the behavioral sci-
ences.”211
Lacking an interpretation of Rule 702 which is appropriate to
behavioral science testimony, the Michigan court instead relied upon
the balancing inquiry of Rules 401, 402, and 403.212 These rules re-
quire that the evidence be relevant, in that it can assist the trier of
208. See People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 404 (Mich. 1990) (“[T]here is a fundamental
difference between techniques and procedures based on chemical, biological, or other physical
sciences as contrasted with theories and assumptions that are based on the behavioral sci-
ences.”).
209. Id. (quoting Dirk Lorenzen, The Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony in
Cases Involving the Sexual Misuse of a Child, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1046-48 (1988)). The
Davis/Frye test takes its name from People v. Davis, 72 N.W.2d 269 (Mich. 1955) and Frye v.
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and requires the proponent of the evidence to show
that “the scientific principle or technique has gained such general acceptance within the scien-
tific community as to render the technique or principle reliable.” Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 403.
210. See Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 404.
211. Id.
212. See id. (“[A]dmissibility of the expert testimony, under the limitations set forth in this
opinion [rejecting Davis/Frye], is an effort to accommodate the uniqueness of the child-victim’s
reactions while at the same time avoiding undue reliance on such testimony.”).
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fact,213 and that the probative value of the evidence outweigh any ac-
companying prejudice.214 On the basis of a “general test of relevancy,”
Michigan’s court disagreed with the courts of Pennsylvania and Ken-
tucky and concluded that expert testimony would be helpful and ap-
propriate because the average juror is sufficiently inexperienced and
uninformed regarding common responses to sexual abuse.215 The de-
cision of Michigan’s court was proper in light of the strong possibility
of lay misconception, the difficulties presented by child witnesses, the
usual lack of physical evidence, and the societal bias against rape and
abuse victims.216
The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately asserted that behav-
ioral science testimony is “safe” from undue reliance when its use is
limited to cases where the behavior of the victim is at issue.217 In prac-
tice, experts are limited to testimony which “rebut[s] an inference
that specific behavioral patterns attributed to the victim are not un-
characteristic of the class of child sexual abuse victims.”218 The expert
may also testify regarding common traits and characteristics of sexu-
ally abused children but may not make reference to a “fixed set of
behaviors constituting a ‘syndrome.’”219 The exclusion of the term
“syndrome” was meant to remove the danger of jury confusion and
overvaluation of the expert’s testimony.220 A more recent Michigan
Supreme Court decision, People v. Peterson,221 affirmed the result in
Beckley and clarified that the prosecution need not wait for an ex-
plicit attack on the complainant’s credibility to present expert testi-
213. See id. at 400-01 (“This uniqueness [of the victim’s reactions to a sexual assault] puts
the evidence beyond the jury’s ability to properly evaluate the facts in issue absent expert tes-
timony.”).
214. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussing Federal Rules of Evidence
402 and 403, which served as the templates for Michigan’s own Rule 402 and Rule 403).
215. Compare Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 400-01 (asserting that “the findings of professional
research suggest that there are many seemingly inconsistent responses to the trauma of [sexual
abuse] which require some further form of explanation”), with Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602
A.2d 830, 837-38 (Pa. 1992) (asserting that the jury’s outside experience will provide a reason-
able explanation for why children are reluctant to reveal the abuse), and Newkirk v. Common-
wealth, 937 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Ky. 1996) (asserting that expert testimony is not needed because
the jury is capable of looking beyond the easy excuses provided by the defendant which con-
trast with the weakness of the victim’s testimony to arrive at an appropriate verdict).
216. See Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 400-02.
217. See id. at 404.
218. Id. at 409.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 408.
221. 537 N.W.2d. 857 (Mich. 1995).
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mony from a behavioral scientist but may instead present an explana-
tion of the “commonality seen in victims of child sexual abuse” dur-
ing its case in chief.222
The Michigan court has taken the view that the nature of be-
havioral science testimony is not so complex that jurors will be un-
able to comprehend the “technical” details that underlie the explana-
tion of probable victim responses.223 Consequently, there is no real
need to mandate general acceptance of this type of expert testimony
as a means of ensuring that the underlying scientific method is sound;
the jury can readily comprehend the method of the behavioral scien-
tist.224 The Michigan approach calls for a balance between the need to
explain the child-victim’s reaction and the fact that there is a limit to
the helpfulness of behavioral science evidence. With this balancing
method, Michigan has departed from the more rigid standards set
forth in either Frye or Daubert when considering behavioral science
evidence and has moved to a pragmatic and rational standard which
examines, on a case-by-case basis, the evidence and the use for which
it has been offered.
CONCLUSION
There is something unsettling about the fact that some courts
find that the societal misperceptions about child sexual abuse must be
corrected while others profess doubt over the existence of any such
misperceptions. Even more disturbing is the effect that these differ-
ing attitudes have on child sexual abuse prosecutions which rely on
child-victim testimony—like the story about “Mary” in the Introduc-
tion. The heart of the problem seems to rest in the convoluted ap-
proaches taken by various jurisdictions: some strictly apply Frye or
Daubert, treating the expert testimony as a hard science; some apply
a Rule 702 “helpfulness” standard, implying that the expert testi-
mony falls within the category of “specialized or other technical in-
formation”; and still others apply only a basic Rule 403 relevancy in-
quiry to determine whether the evidence adds anything helpful in the
search for the truth. These disparate approaches are sure to lead to
222. Id. at 870. Diagnostic use of CSAS or CSAAS does not even merit consideration under
this new standard, because it fails to meet the basic relevancy standard; employment of these
syndromes as detectors of abuse voids any probative value the syndrome may have had, be-
cause professionals summarily reject this use as improper. See id.
223. See Beckley, 456 N.W.2d at 400-01.
224. See id. at 402.
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disparate results, and yet, each court maintains that its approach is
the right one.
The compelling circumstances of child sexual abuse prosecutions
demonstrate that the jurisdictions which do not distinguish between
Newtonian science and other forms of expertise have not, in fact,
found the right solution. The failure to make such a distinction leads
to an absolute ban on clearly useful and relevant testimony in Penn-
sylvania and Kentucky or, as in South Dakota, to a distortion of Frye
and Daubert so that such evidence may be introduced. Whether or
not the more pragmatic approach of Michigan is ultimately correct is
a determination best left to each jurisdiction. At the least, however,
such an approach has the benefit of balancing the jury’s right to
evaluate credibility with the usefulness of social science theory of
child behavior, while at the same time preserving the strict standards
of Frye and Daubert for application in the appropriate (read: Newto-
nian science) context.
